An unexpected contact on the professional network. An offer of work from a headhunter, most likely a female agent, operating from the Asian nation. The chance to earn perhaps £20,000 on the side preparing a handful of political reports for a Chinese company containing confidential or privileged information. Compensation in digital currency or cash preferred.
It may seem obvious, in this scenario, that something about this method would be amiss. However, China’s influential intelligence agency continues to view it valuable to use headhunters to attempt this – prompting MI5 to warn repeatedly about their activity online.
Massive Contact Attempts on Professional Networks
Last year, the head of MI5 Ken McCallum said operatives from China were approaching UK citizens on LinkedIn on an unprecedented scale, at a frequency of ten thousand over the previous two and a half years, seeking governmental, commercial, defense and technological classified information. However a new initiative aimed at elected officials and Westminster has prompted the intelligence service to act again.
A spying warning was issued on this week via the offices of Lindsay Hoyle and his Lords equivalent: a brief presentation after the persistent attempts of Shirly Shen and other operatives to contact Members of Parliament, lords, their assistants, economists, research organizations – anybody who might become a source.
Intelligence Approach and Legal Updates
In the typical style of UK security services, there was no publication of the security advice from the agency or the Home Office. But the agency was aware its briefing note would become public once it was sent electronically out to Westminster. Republishing it in the media assists the wider public more easily recognize communications with a fraudulent intent.
This warning has the impact of uncovering additional details from within parliament, although that is not the agency's primary purpose. The service wants people in public life to understand that just because exchanges on LinkedIn are less overtly risky as on other social platforms, it doesn't imply they are completely safe.
Nor is domestic spy agency understood to have been reacting to a particular event in the legislature, although the recent actions does come after the awkward collapse of the prosecution of a ex-assistant an individual and his associate Christopher Berry on a legal detail earlier in the autumn.
Both individuals had been charged of working for China – a allegation they rejected – but failure to complete a prosecution under the now repealed Official Secrets Act resulted in concerns that the UK's political system had been left unprotected.
Revised Legislation and China's Long-Term Goals
The law has now been changed, and the security briefing includes a reminder of its replacement: “Those engaging in espionage activity risk significant criminal penalties under the new security law.” It is a crime if a person participates in behavior that could potentially “materially assist a foreign intelligence service”.
A natural question, however, is what China has to achieve. A politician who is not a government minister will have limited knowledge of classified material, and an contact of theirs less so. Yet Beijing is also interested in parliament: for a period, in recent years, the UK’s China policy on matters such as the telecom firm or the human rights situation or alleged atrocities was being influenced by parliamentarians.
Cultural Differences and Persistent Digital Threats
In part there are distinct approaches too. Authoritarian governments like China’s export intelligence collection methods and the size of its spy network is vast, employing three hundred thousand people. Chris Inglis, a US national cyber director under the US administration, commented it was occasionally assessed that “China have more English speakers engaged in this than we [western intelligence] have English speakers”.
The Chinese government is willing to cultivate people over the extended period and sometimes even the agencies have found it difficult to differentiate legitimate relationships and spying. “China has a minimal requirement for which details is deemed to be of value,” security minister Dan Jarvis told parliamentarians on this week, but a rapid shift in the government situation may mean someone quickly marginal turning important.
An alternative perspective to think about the continuous efforts at secret information gathering is in the broader framework of the geopolitical contest between China and the west at a threshold under the level of outright war. China has stepped up its hacking efforts, with the Salt Typhoon infiltration of phone and data networks in 80 countries, and the another operation compromise of millions connected equipment.
Beijing is engaged in persistent attempts to find covert sources on UK politics via digital means because it seeks to be provocative, to demonstrate influence and because it can.